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ABSTRACT
This study examines whether ownership structure which was divided into blockholder
ownership, managerial ownership, and public ownership had influence on corporate
governance disclosure, and whether growth opportunities moderate that influence. Stud-
ies in this area mostly examined the role of ownership structure on corporate financial
disclosure or public announcements conducted in the context of different countries and
in more regulated industries in Indonesia. The scope of this study was manufacturing
companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the period of 2013. The results
showed that between the ownership structures only blockholder ownership had a nega-
tive and significant influence on the corporate governance disclosure. Being the largest
shareholders, blockholders might have better access on the inside information which
made them better informed relative to other shareholders, thus arguably might desire less
disclosure. The results also showed that the interaction variable between managerial
ownership and growth opportunities was negative and significant. This indicates that in
a growing company where the managerial ownership increases, the management would
tend to reduce the corporate governance information they provided to the stakeholders.
ABSTRAK
Penelitian ini menguji apakah struktur kepemilikan yang dibagi menjadi kepemilikan blockholder,
kepemilikan manajerial, dan kepemilikan publik memiliki pengaruh terhadap pernyataan tata
kelola perusahaan, dan apakah kesempatan bertumbuh memoderasi pengaruh tersebut. Adapun
kebanyakan penelitian di bidang ini hanya mengusut peran struktur kepemilikan terhadap
pernyataan keuangan perusahaan atau pengumuman publik, dilakukan di luar Indonesia dalam
konteks negara yang berbeda, sedangkan yang ada di Indonesia dilakukan pada industri yang
sangat ketat dikendalikan oleh aturan. Obyek penelitian ini adalah perusahaan-perusahaan
manufaktur yang terdaftar dalam Bursa Efek Indonesia untuk periode tahun 2013. Hasil penelitian
ini menunjukkan bahwa di antara struktur kepemilikan yang ada, hanya kepemilikan blockholder
yang memiliki pengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap pernyataan tata kelola perusahaan. Sebagai
pemegang saham terbesar dalam perusahaan, blockholder kemungkinan besar memiliki akses
yang lebih baik terhadap informasi dalam perusahaan yang membuat mereka lebih banyak tahu
kondisi perusahaan dibandingkan pemegang saham yang lain, yang kemudian menyebabkan
penyajian informasi dalam pernyataan tata kelola perusahaan menjadi lebih terbatas. Hasil
penelitian ini juga menunjukkan bahwa variabel interaksi antara kepemilikan manajerial dan
kesempatan bertumbuh juga negatif signifikan. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa pada perusahaan
yang sedang bertumbuh ketika kepemilikan manajerial bertambah, manajemen akan cenderung
mengurangi informasi yang disajikan dalam pernyataan tata kelola perusahaan.
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Corporate disclosure serves as one form of ac-
countability of the management to stakeholders.
It has a role of reducing information asymmetry
between management and shareholders (Utama,
2012). Management usually knows more about the
operations of the company, thus possessing inside
information. While this information may not be
easily available, corporate disclosure can be one
of the means for shareholders to obtain informa-
tion about corporate financial and non-financial
activities. Consequently, for the owners of capi-
tal, corporate disclosure can serve as the basis to
examine corporate performance (Healy & Palepu,
2001).
Different companies may have different ways
of disclosing information. Some might disclose
more, while others can choose otherwise, and it
may depend on the information needed by the
owners of capital. In other words, different types
of shareholders may have different interest in cor-
porate disclosure. Thus, there will be different
influence given by different types of shareholders
to the information disclosed by a company.
In 2010, there was a 12 percent -investment
growth in the manufacturing sector from previ-
ous year, and a 5 percent -up-to-6 percent growth
during the first semester of 2011 (Global Business
Guide Indonesia, 2011), which most probably was
more accentuated in 2013. This implies that as the
investment in manufacturing sectors grows, inves-
tors may be more interested in how companies
manage their funds. Hence, corporate disclosure
could be one means to provide for the needs.
As a company grows, the chance of that com-
pany to be scrutinized may be escalated. Some
studies argued that bigger companies are more
visible, thus required more disclosure to be ac-
countable to the stakeholders (Liu & Sun, 2010).
This study conjectured that a company that had
higher growth opportunities would choose to dis-
close more, thus moderating the impact of owner-
ship structure on corporate governance disclosure,
although as Nuryaman (2009) argued, a company
might still have an intention to retain information
for competitive reason.
Most studies in this area of study examined
the role of ownership structure on corporate fi-
nancial disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003; Wang et al.,
2008; Utama, 2012) or public announcement dis-
closure (Laidroo, 2009). In fact, corporate gover-
nance disclosure has only been examined in the
context of different countries outside Indonesia
(Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008; Collett & Hrasky,
2005; Jain & Nangia, 2014), or in Indonesia, as part
of bigger voluntary corporate disclosure scope
(Nuryaman, 2009), and in a more regulated indus-
try (Darmadi, 2013). In addition, the role of growth
opportunities on corporate governance disclosure
has not been particularly studied yet. Therefore,
this study examined the impact of ownership struc-
ture on corporate governance disclosure, by tak-
ing into consideration the moderating role of
growth opportunities. To extend this study, dif-
ferent types of ownership structure were exam-
ined, which are blockholder ownership, manage-
rial ownership, and public ownership.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The presentation of corporate disclosure,
particularly the corporate annual report, as an
important decision making tool is required by
regulations as well as demanded by stakeholders.
According to Kurniawan & Indriantoro (2000),
companies are required to provide certain disclo-
sures based on the regulations set by the govern-
ment and the capital market. The asymmetric of
information and agency conflicts between manage-
ment and external shareholders are also the trig-
gers for demand over corporate disclosure as ar-
gued by Healy & Palepu (2001).
Corporate governance disclosure is one com-
ponent of corporate annual report. Although man-
datorily enforced by Bapepam-LK, it can serve as
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a voluntary disclosure to the extent that a listed
company may choose to disclose broader or more
detail than the required information. On the other
hand, whenever a company prepares lesser infor-
mation, the decision making of the shareholders
can be affected. This is because relevant and im-
portant information might be omitted, thus have
a potential to mislead the stakeholders
(Nuryaman, 2009).
Corporate governance disclosure is consid-
erably understudied. In particular, there are not
many studies that have examined about corporate
governance disclosure as a stand-alone disclosure,
especially in Indonesia. Research studies in Indo-
nesia is mainly conducted around corporate finan-
cial disclosure (e.g., Utama, 2012), and when cor-
porate governance disclosure was being studied,
it was included as a part of larger scope of corpo-
rate disclosure (Nuryaman, 2009), and conducted
in a highly regulated and more limited scope of
industry (Darmadi, 2013). There are several stud-
ies that have been done outside of Indonesia such
as in the context of European Union (Bauwhede &
Willekens, 2008), Australia (Collett & Hrasky,
2005), and India (Jain & Nangia, 2014). However,
it could be argued that those studies are irrelevant
to the Indonesian context since those countries
may have different governance setting from
Indonesia’s.
The influence given by ownership structure
on corporate financial and non-financial perfor-
mance has been widely studied. In particular,
Ghalandari (2013) stated that the conflict of inter-
est among shareholders had become the founda-
tion for examining the influence of ownership
structure on firm value. However, the components
of ownership structure might be different across
studies. Several among those studies were
blockholder ownership, proxied by the proportion
of 5% or more shareholdings (Utama, 2012) or the
largest individual shareholdings (Nuryaman,
2009), which is also deemed to measure owner-
ship concentration; state ownership and foreign
ownership (Wang et al., 2008), and so on. In this
study, the ownership structure was divided into
blockholder ownership, managerial ownership,
and public ownership.
Bapepam-LK requires every corporate an-
nual report to enclose brief information regard-
ing corporate governance practices in publicly
listed company. That information should at least
cover (1) the responsibilities, remunerations, meet-
ing frequencies of board of commissioners and
board of directors, (2) the responsibilities, profiles,
and activities of the audit committee and other
supporting committees, (3) the role and responsi-
bilities, profile, and background of corporate sec-
retary, (4) explanations regarding internal audit,
internal control system, risk management system,
important cases, sanctions, business ethics and
corporate culture, shareholdings by management
and/or employees, as well as whistleblowing sys-
tem (Bapepam-LK, 2012). Although mandated by
the regulator, corporate governance disclosure
could be voluntary to the extent that the disclosed
information is broader and more detailed. There-
fore, it is somewhat beneficial to examine corpo-
rate governance practices in a corporation through
the disclosure provided.
Business ownership can be one of many fac-
tors that are influential to corporate financial and
non-financial practices. Through share ownership,
shareholders may directly or indirectly impose
certain things to a company, for example demand-
ing particular information to be provided in the
corporate disclosure. However, given that access
to certain types of information may be limited to
shareholders (Deegan, 2006), and given that dif-
ferent shareholders may use different information
for decision making purposes, the ownership struc-
ture might have different influence on corporate
disclosure. Therefore, studies related to business
ownership are particularly interested in analyz-
ing whether different structures of business own-
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ership have different impact, particularly on cor-
porate governance disclosure.
Eng & Mak (2003) assert that companies with
low blockholder ownerships (i.e., more diffused)
will be required to provide more information to
the fact that monitoring mechanism is much needed
in that situation. Moreover, Khlif et al. (2016) state
that the agency conflicts between controlling share-
holders and management are fewer, suggesting
that corporate disclosures are less important for
the controlling shareholders. Indeed, in their meta-
analysis study Khlif et al. (2016) found that own-
ership concentration (i.e., blockholder ownership)
is negatively influenced voluntary disclosure.
Therefore, it is expected that when blockholder
ownership which is the representation of control-
ling shareholders increase, the corporate gover-
nance disclosure will decrease.
H
1a
: blockholder ownership has a negative influ-
ence on corporate governance disclosure
Similarly, Eng & Mak (2003) assert that com-
panies whose managerial ownerships are low will
be required to provide more information to miti-
gate agency problems. This is due to managers may
have greater tendencies to expropriate or to shirk.
In addition, Khlif et al. (2016) also state that in the
existence of entrenchment effect, insider share-
holders may reduce disclosures. In fact, they found
that in Singapore, the influence of managerial
ownership on voluntary disclosure is negatively
significant. Comparably, Leung & Horwitz (2004)
also found that in Hong Kong, the voluntary seg-
ment disclosure decreases whenever director own-
ership increases, and it is more profound among
companies with poor performance. Additionally,
the study of Baek et al. (2009) also found a nega-
tive impact of managerial ownership towards the
level of disclosure of companies in S&P 500 index,
suggesting that the increase in managerial owner-
ship will decrease agency costs, which conse-
quently decrease the level of disclosure. There-
fore, it is expected that as managerial ownership
increases, the corporate governance disclosure will
decrease.
H
1b
: managerial ownership has a negative influence
on corporate governance disclosure.
However, there has not been found any in-
formation regarding how the remaining general
public ownership, usually categorized as minority
shareholders, is related to corporate disclosure.
Khlif et al. (2016) state that more dispersed share-
holders would require more information to moni-
tor the management. Consequently, because pub-
lic ownership is more dispersed than other types
of ownership, this study argues that public in gen-
eral has little information regarding the operation
of a company, thus demand more information to
be provided. Hence, it is expected that as public
ownership increases, the corporate governance
disclosure will increase.
H
1c
: public ownership has a positive influence on
corporate governance disclosure.
Studies had also been performed regarding
the relation between ownership structure and
growth opportunites (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2001; López-
Iturriaga & Crisóstomo, 2010; Ghalandari, 2013).
López-Iturriaga & Crisóstomo (2010) argued that
since dominant shareholders may have more con-
trol, they are more likely to exploit new projects
which in the presence of growth opportunities will
tend to be more profound. Ghalandari (2013) in
particular found that the moderating effect of
growth opportunities on the influence of owner-
ship structure towards firm value is significant and
non-linear, both in the presence and the absence
of growth opportunities. This implies how growth
opportunities can moderate the effect of owner-
ship structure on possibly many other aspects.
Given that there is no other study that has been
examined the moderating effect of growth op-
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portunities on the relation between ownership
structure and corporate disclosure practices of a
company, and drawing from the hypothetical re-
lation between ownership structure and growth
opportunities, the second hypotheses are:
H
2a
: Growth opportunities moderate the influence
of blockholder ownership on corporate gov-
ernance disclosure.
H
2b
: Growth opportunities moderate the influence
of managerial ownership on corporate gov-
ernance disclosure.
H
2c
: Growth opportunities moderate the influence
of public ownership on corporate governance
disclosure.
METHOD
The population of this study was the listed
manufacturing companies in Indonesia on the year
of 2013, which consists of 136 companies (Indone-
sian Stock Exchange, 2014). The sample observa-
tions are obtained based on several criteria: (1)
manufacturing companies that were consistently
listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2014,
and (2) published financial reports in Indonesian
Rupiah (IDR). Based on the above criteria, the
sample selection can be seen in Table 1.
Table 1. Sampel Selection
gerial ownership, public ownership, and growth
opportunities. Corporate governance disclosure
(CGDISC) is measured as an index, a proportion
of all disclosed items. The index is calculated by
giving a score of 1 to an item that is disclosed and
0 otherwise. Following Nuryaman (2009), the for-
mula is:
 Firm 
Observations 
Criteria:  
Listed manufacturing 
companies on 2013 
136 
Less:  
Delisting companies 2 
Financial Statements not 
reported in IDR 
28 
Final Sample 106 
 
The dependent variable in this study is
corporate governance disclosure, and the indepen-
dent variables are blockholder ownership, mana-
ܥܩܦܫܵܥ = σܳσܵ  × 100% 
Where, CGDISC is the corporate governance
disclosure index of a company; Q is the total items
disclosed on the corporate governance disclosure
section of the corporate annual report, and S is
the maximum items of corporate governance dis-
closure expected to be disclosed in the corporate
annual report.
Blockholder ownership (BLOCK) is mea-
sured by the largest percentage of shares owned
by institutional or individual shareholders. Mana-
gerial ownership (MANOWN) is measured by the
total proportion of shares owned by any member
of the board of commissioners and/or the board
of directors. Public ownership (PUBOWN) is mea-
sured by the total proportion of shares owned by
the public, while the growth opportunities
(GROWTH), which is the moderating variable, is
measured by Market to Book Ratio.
There are three control variables in this
study; they are financial performance, leverage,
and firm size. Financial performance (ROA) is
measured by return on assets which is the ratio of
earnings divided by total assets, leverage (LEV)
is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets, and firm size (SIZE) is measured by natu-
ral logarithm of total assets.
Research Model
Model 1.
CGDISC
it
 = E
0
 + E
1
MANOWN
it
 + E
2
BLOCK
it
 +
E
3
PUBOWN
it
 + E
4
ROA
it
 + E
5
LEV
it
 +
E
6
SIZE
it
 + H
it
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Model 2.
CGDISC
it
 = E
0
 + E
1
MANOWN
it
 + E
2
BLOCK
it
 +
E
3
PUBOWN
it
 + E
4
GROWTH
it
 +
E
5
MANOWN*GROWTH
it
 + E
6
BLOCK*
GROWTH
it
 + E
7
PUBOWN*GROWTH
it
+ â
8
ROA
it
 + E
9
LEV
it
 + E
10
SIZE
it
 + H
it
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of 106 observations
are presented in Table 2. On average, the corpo-
rate governance sections in the annual report only
contain approximately 49 percent of the total cor-
porate governance disclosure items. The manufac-
turing companies disclosed at least 4 percent of
the total items, while the highest disclosure is 92
percent. The blockholders owned approximately
50 percent of the total shares, indicating control-
ling interest over the average companies. On the
other hand, the managerial ownerships were rela-
tively low. Managements only owned around 3per-
cent of the outstanding shares of the companies,
on average. The average companies had approxi-
mately 26 percent public ownership and experi-
ence around 4 percent growth. The profitability
was approximately 6 percent and the average com-
panies had Rp. 6,6 trillion in total assets (i.e., log
natural of 28). The leverage was around 0.5 which
indicates that, on average, the companies’ debt is
50 percent of the total assets.
Table 3 presents the results of the impact of
ownership structure on corporate governance dis-
closure. The Adjusted R-squared indicated that
23.2 percent of the change in corporate governance
disclosure could be affected by the dependent vari-
ables.
The results of the first hypothesis testing
showed that between the ownership structures
analyzed in this study, only blockholder owner-
ship had a significant influence on the corporate
governance disclosure. The p-value was 0.022
which was significant in 0.05 level. The coefficient
showed a negative sign, meaning when the own-
ership increased, the level of disclosure decreased.
This supports hypothesis 1a.
Table 3. Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance
Disclosure
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CGDISC 106 0.488 0.159 0.040 0.920 
BLOCK 106 50.634 23.594 10.170 98.180 
MANOWN 106 3.239 9.983 0 77.790 
PUBOWN 106 25.536 18.158 0 91.620 
GROWTH 106 3.562 10.183 -29.670 79.650 
ROA 106 6.225 12.004 -34.600 65.720 
SIZE 106 27.967 1.551 24.530 33 
LEV 106 0.522 0.386 0 2.730 
 
Variables Coefficients P > ۄ t ۄ 
BLOCK -0.002* 0.022 
MANOWN 0.000 0.903 
PUBOWN -0.002 0.080 
ROA 0.002* 0.046 
SIZE 0.044*** 0.000 
LEV -0.061 0.260 
Constant -0.591* 0.025 
Dependent CGDISC  
Observations 106  
R-squared 0.276  
Adj. R-squared 0.232  
F-test 4.939  
Prob > F 0.0002  
Legend: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
To analyze the moderating effect of growth
opportunities on the impact of ownership struc-
ture to corporate governance disclosure, interac-
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tion variables between each ownership structure
attribute and the growth opportunities were used.
The problem that is obvious in the regression us-
ing interaction variables is the high possibility of
multicollinearity. To avoid this problem, all of the
predictor variables were centered by calculating
the differences between each of the predictor vari-
ables and their means.
Table 4 presents the results of the regres-
sions without and with the interaction variables.
The overall results for both regressions showed
that the models were significant given the prob-
ability F-tests are 0.000. The adjusted R-squared
was 22.8% for the regression without interaction
which then increased to 23.7% when using the in-
teraction variables. This indicates that the exist-
ence of growth opportunities increased the ex-
planatory power of the model.
Sensitivity Analysis
In a sensitivity analysis, the growth oppor-
tunities were separated on its mean and dummy
Table 4. Ownership Structure, Growth Opportunities, and Corporate Governance Disclosure
coded the higher than mean growth into 1 which
represented high growth, and 0 otherwise, which
represented low growth. The results on higher
growth companies showed similar findings with
a slightly higher coefficient of determination (i.e.,
24.3%). However, unlike previous results,
blockholder ownership did not show a significant
influence anymore, but public ownership did.
Nevertheless, the interaction between managerial
ownership and growth opportunities was consis-
tently negative and significant. It can be argued
that there might be a trade-off between investing
on company growth and providing information;
therefore, management might choose to reduce the
information disclosed, which was especially evi-
dent in higher growth companies.
DISCUSSION
Ownership Structure and Corporate
Governance Disclosure
Blockholders can be observed as the most
sophisticated shareholders of a company. They
 Without Interaction With Interaction 
Variables Coefficients P > ۄ t ۄ Coefficients P > ۄ t ۄ 
BLOCK -0.002* 0.019 -0.002* 0.041 
MANOWN 0.000 0.881 0.002* 0.016 
PUBOWN -0.002 0.073 -0.001 0.203 
GROWTH -0.001 0.455 0.001 0.782 
BLOCK*GROWTH   0.000 0.633 
MANOWN*GROWTH   -0.001*** 0.000 
PUBOWN*GROWTH   0.000 0.090 
ROA 0.003* 0.028 0.002 0.208 
SIZE 0.044*** 0.000 0.047*** 0.000 
LEV -0.057 0.289 -0.056 0.326 
Constant -0.726** 0.008 -0.791** 0.007 
Dependent CGDISC CGDISC 
Observations 106 106 
R-squared 0.279 0.309 
Adj. R-squared 0.228 0.237 
F-test 4.364 17.20 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
Legend: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05   
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  Without Interaction With Interaction 
Variables Coefficients P > ۄ t ۄ Coefficients P > ۄ t ۄ 
BLOCK -0.002* 0.019 -0.001 0.089 
MANOWN 0.000 0.881 0.003** 0.004 
PUBOWN -0.002 0.073 -0.002* 0.036 
GROWTH -0.001 0.455 -0.000 0.852 
BLOCK_HIGROWTH   -0.001 0.204 
MANOWN_HIGROWTH   -0.005*** 0.000 
PUBOWN_HIGROWTH   0.001 0.232 
ROA 0.003* 0.028 0.003* 0.030 
SIZE 0.044*** 0.000 0.047*** 0.000 
LEV -0.057 0.289 -0.043 0.423 
Constant -0.726** 0.008 -0.708** 0.010 
Dependent CGDISC CGDISC 
Observations 106 106 
R-squared 0.279 0.315 
Adj. R-squared 0.228 0.243 
F-test 4.364 11.420 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
Legend: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
 
Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis
own the largest portion of the company’s share
which in this study was approximately 50% of the
total shares. This indicates that on average they
have controlling interest over the company. Being
the largest shareholders, they might have better
access to the inside information which makes them
better informed relative to other shareholders.
Arguably, having a privilege of possessing exten-
sive information about the company, this type of
shareholders might desire less disclosure on the
corporate annual report. The result is consistent
with the study of Khlif et al. (2016). It is parallel
with the argument of Kim (1993) and Eng & Mak
(2003) which state that shareholders with better
information might desire less disclosure. As a con-
sequence, minority shareholders who have less
access to inside information and whose interests
are not met by the disclosure decision of a com-
pany will tend to exercise pressure to regulatory
bodies in imposing regulation to increase the level
of disclosure.
Among the control variables, ROA and SIZE
showed positive and significant influence on cor-
porate governance disclosure (p-values equal to
0.046 and 0.000 respectively). This indicates that a
larger and more profitable company tends to dis-
close more information. It is most likely that larger
companies tend to receive more attention from the
stakeholders, and more profitable companies have
the capacity to absorb more costs than their coun-
terparts (Wang et al., 2008).
Ownership Structure, Growth Opportunities,
and Corporate Governance Disclosure
In the presence of growth opportunities, two
of the ownership structure attributed in this study
(i.e., blockholder ownership and managerial own-
ership) significantly affected corporate governance
disclosure. The influence of blockholder owner-
ship was negative, consistent with the previous
hypothesis testing. Nevertheless, the influence of
managerial ownership on corporate governance
disclosure was positive which was an indication
of more information would be provided as the
managerial ownership increased.
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The results also showed that the interaction
variable between managerial ownership and
growth opportunities was significant, thus sup-
ported hypothesis 2b that growth opportunities
moderated the influence of ownership structure
on corporate governance disclosure. However,
there was no evidence that growth opportunities
moderated the impact of blockholder ownership
and public ownership. Although it was evident that
growth opportunities moderated the impact of
managerial ownership on corporate governance
disclosure (p-value was significant on 0.001 level),
the influence was negative. There was an indica-
tion that in a growing company where the mana-
gerial ownership increased, the management
would have the tendency to reduce the corporate
governance information they provided to the
stakeholders. The findings are similar to those of
Baek et al. (2009), Eng & Mak (2003), Khlif et al.
(2016), and Leung & Horwitz (2004), although
growth opportunities are not present in those stud-
ies. Besides this could be driven by competitive
reasons (Nuryaman, 2009), the tendency to reduce
information is also aligned with the arguments of
Eng & Mak (2003) and Baek et al. (2009) who state
that managerial ownership can be a mechanism to
reduce agency costs, thus whenever managerial
ownership increase, the agency costs will decrease,
thus consequently decrease the level of disclosure.
Among the control variables in this model, only
size had a positive and significant influence on
corporate governance disclosure, which was con-
sistent with previous test.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
Conclusion
This study revisited the relation between
ownership structure and corporate disclosure, in
the presence of growth opportunities. Particularly,
it was to examine the effect of growth opportu-
nity on the relation between blockholder owner-
ship, managerial ownership, public ownership, and
corporate governance disclosure.
Blockholders are shareholders with the larg-
est share ownership which might have better ac-
cess to information and might be more informed
relative to other shareholders. Thus, they might
require less disclosure on the corporate annual
report. Managerial ownership on the other hand
is ownership held by management, and public
ownership refers to shares owned by the public.
The results showed that there was a negative in-
fluence of blockholder ownership towards corpo-
rate governance disclosure, which was consistent
with previous theory. On the other hand, mana-
gerial ownership and public ownership did not
show significant results.
In the presence of growth opportunities,
blockholder ownership and managerial ownership
significantly affected corporate governance disclo-
sure. Consistent with previous hypothesis testing,
the main effects showed that the influence of
blockholder ownership was negative. However,
it was significantly positive between managerial
ownership and corporate governance disclosure,
indicating that increased ownership would result
in more disclosure.
The results concerning the interaction be-
tween managerial ownership and growth oppor-
tunities was negative and significant, thus it is
evident that growth opportunities moderated the
influence of ownership structure on corporate gov-
ernance disclosure. There was an indication that
in a growing company where the managerial own-
ership increased, the management would have the
tendency to reduce the corporate governance in-
formation they provided to the stakeholders,
which could be for competitive reasons. However,
the evidence that growth opportunities moderated
the relation between ownership structure and cor-
porate governance disclosure was absent among
blockholder ownership and public ownership.
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Among the control variables, ROA and SIZE
were positive and significant in the first hypoth-
esis testing. The results indicate that a larger and
more profitable company tends to disclose more
information, because larger companies generally
receive more attention from the stakeholders, and
more profitable companies may have the capacity
to bear more costs. The positive and significant
result of SIZE was consistent when testing the sec-
ond hypothesis.
Suggestion
The practical implications of this study would
be two folds. First, for manufacturing companies
there are indications that blockholder ownership
and managerial ownership could serve as moni-
toring mechanisms, in order to mitigate agency
costs between inside and outside shareholders.
Second, given that there is no study that has ex-
amined the moderating effect of growth opportu-
nities towards the relation between ownership
structures and corporate disclosure practices could
be an indication that the accounting field might
flourish with more possible investigations related
to the role of growth opportunities on ownership
structure or corporate disclosure practices.
There are several limitations of this study.
First, the period of study was only for one period
and the sector was exclusive to manufacturing in-
dustries, which confined the results to have low
external validity. This study did not examine the
non-linear relationship between ownership struc-
ture and disclosure, which could be a suggestion
for future study. It is also limited to the corporate
governance disclosure which is relatively a small
part of corporate disclosures. Future study can
expand to other information provided in the cor-
porate financial and non-financial disclosures.
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